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NOTES AND COMMENTS

BANKRUPTCY
RES JUDICATA OF JUDGMENT CREDITORS' CLAIM
Claimant seeks to establish a claim based upon a judgment
obtained against a bankrupt in the U.S. District Court for Southern
California for the value of raw gems fraudulently procured and converted by the bankrupt. After default judgment and before bankruptcy, the bankrupt contested the value of the gems at a hearing
ordered by the district court, which found the value to be as alleged.
No appeal was taken or review had. After the voluntary petition in
bankruptcy, the trustee was authorized to attempt to have the judgment set aside. This he did, claiming that fraud had been practiced
on the district court by claimant in regard to the value of the gems.
The motion to set aside was dismissed for lack of proof. In bankruptcy, the referee disallowed the claim for fraud. The district court
allowed the claim, holding that the issue of fraud in procuring judgment in the California court was res judicata. On appeal from reversal by U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit held: Claim
allowed; the issue of fraud was res judicata, which doctrine is fully
applicable in a federal court sitting in bankruptcy. Heiser -v. Woodruff,
66 S. Ct. 853 (1946).
Only those creditors' claims can be proved and discharged in bankruptcy which are provided for in the Bankruptcy Act,1 and since it
is settled that the merger of a claim into a judgment does not affect
its nature so far as provability in bankruptcy is concerned,2 it is
necessary in each instance of a judgment claim for the court to examine into the nature of the obligation underlying the judgment. If
the original obligation is of the type provable in bankruptcy, the
judgment creditor's claim may be allowed. Although of a provable
character, the judgment may be attacked as invalid due to want of
jurisdiction by the court rendering it over (a) the parties in the action,
or (b) the subject matter involved;s and as a claim in bankruptcy, a
judgment may also be collaterally attacked as having been obtained
4
by fraud or collusion.
Pepper v. Litton,5 although holding that the issue of fraud had
1.

52 Stat. 840 H 17, 63 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. if 35, 103 (Supp. 1945),
Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Lesser v. Gray, 236 U.S.
70, 74 (1915).
2. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Boynton v. Ball, 121 U.S.
457 (1887).
3. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1873); Consolidated
Iron & Steel Co. v. Maumee Iron & Steel Co., 284 Fed. 550 (C.C.A.
8th, 1922).
4. In Re Thompson, 276 Fed. 313 (W.D. Pa. 1921); In Re Stucky
Trucking & Rigging Co., 243 Fed 287 (NJ. 1917); In re Continental Engine Co., 234 Fed. 58 (C.C.A. 7th, 1916); Chandler
v. Thompson, 120 Fed. 940 (C.C.A. 7th, 1902).
5. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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not been litigated,6 had been interpreted as extending the equity jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts to matters within the scope of the doctrine
of res judicata.7 This was due to the statement that, assuming the
claimant's judgment represented a valid underlying obligation, the
bankruptcy court might subordinate the claim to those of other creditors because of the fiduciary relationship in which the claimant stood
8
as owner of the bankrupt one-man corporation. The principal case
or collusion9 where
fraud
of
issue
of
the
reconsideration
the
precludes
it has been previously litigated between the same parties on the
merits.o

CONFLICT OF LAWS
THE ACCUMULATION OF CONTACT POINTS THEORY
Defendants, An Indiana partnership, indebted to the plaintiff, doing
business in Illinois, agreed to make a cash payment and settle the
balance of an open account with a note payable in periodic installments.
6. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 302 (1939). The opinion also
stated that the trustee could collaterally attack a judgment on
grounds of fraud or collusion only in the absence of a valid plea
of res judicata. Id. at 306.
7. In re Noble, 42 F. Supp. 684 (Colo. 1941), reversed in Beneficial
Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F. (2d) 425 (C.C.A. 10th, 1942). See Mr.
Justice Rutledge, concurring in the principal case at 860; 3
Collier, Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) p. 1800. Contra: In re Redwine,
53 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ala. 1944).
8. The court reasoned that since the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 840
§ 57 k. (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 93 k. (1943) provided that "Claims
which have been allowed may be reconsidered for cause and reallowed or rejected in whole or in part, according to the equities
of the case . . . " that such disallowance or subordination in the
light of equitable considerations may be made originally.
9. Following an understandable tendency of courts of equity jurisdiction charged with the duty of marshalling the assets of a debtor
and distributing them equitably among his bona fide creditors;
cf. In re Mallory, 16 Med. Cas. 549, No. 8,991 (Nev. 1871).
10. "But we are aware of no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle
of res judicata, which is founded upon the generally recognized
public policy that there must be some end to litigation and that
when one appears in court to present his case, is fully heard,
and the contested issue is decided against him, he may not later
renew the litigation in another court." Principal case at p. 856.
Compare the language of the District Court of Massachusetts
in Ex parte O'Nield, 18 Fed. Cas. 714, 715, No. 10,527 (Mass.
1867) in refusing to reduce a judgment claim based on damages
challenged as excessive, "Where the court rendering judgment has
jurisdiction, and there has been no fraud and no preference, no
one can examine into the consideration of a judgment, and show
by evidence, outside of the record, that the judgment ought not
to have been rendered, or not for so large a sum."
The similar English view is asserted In re Howell, 84 L.J.
1399, 1400 (&B. 1915). "The working rule is that the Registrar
can go behind a judgment, where it is a judgment by default or
compromise. He ought not to go behind it, when the judgment
has been given in open court against a person who is represented."

